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ABSTRACT 
Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation* 
The aim of this Paper is to evaluate simultaneously market power and the 
incentives faced by carriers to improve efficiency, taking into account the 
regulatory changes that have affected the European airline industry. We 
construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost 
equations. The latter accounts for inefficiency and cost-reducing effort. Using 
a non-nested test and observations on the largest European airlines between 
1985 and 1999, we show the importance of following such an approach. We 
also find that the introduction of the last EU package of deregulatory 
measures has affected carriers’ behaviour in a significant manner. 
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Submitted 10 October 2003 1 Introduction
Empirical models of competition are built around a demand and a price equa-
tion. The price equation shows that prices are determined as a mark-up on
marginal costs that depends on the toughness of competition. These models are
normally used to measure competition in an industry in one moment of time,
to determine if competition has varied after some structural change, to identify
price wars, etc.
In these models, marginal costs are represented by a more or less well de…ned
cost function that assumes that …rms are e¢cient and treat observed costs as
exogenous. This is in contradiction with a long tradition of empirical literature
related to the measurement of e¢ciency through the estimation of production
and cost functions (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In particular, cost func-
tion speci…cations include an error term with two components independent of
each other: a symmetric component that measures random variations of the
frontier across …rms and captures the e¤ects of measurement error, other sta-
tistical noise and random shocks outside the …rm’s control, and a one-sided
component that captures the e¤ect of global ine¢ciency relative to the stochas-
tic frontier. Note that the so-called global ine¢ciency includes pure technical
ine¢ciency that is exogenous to the actions of the …rm as well as endogenous
cost-reducing activities.
Moreover, it is worth noting that a more recent literature on incentives and
informational asymmetries has proposed a theoretical framework in order to
account for the e¤ect of cost-reducing actions of the …rm and has, therefore,
shed new light on costs endogeneity. The new theory of regulation (See La¤ont,
1994) suggests that the producer’s endogenous e¤ort closely depends on the
2constraints exerted by the regulatory environment it faces. Empirical works on
this latter topic have not been numerous so far.1
These two elements, technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort, are of particular im-
portance when comparing industries subject to di¤erent incentives, or changes
in …rms’ behavior after a structural change in the rules governing the market.
Exogenous di¤erences among markets or shocks that can change the incentives
to compete in one market can be related to regulation, competition policy or
international trade policy.
This is the case of the European airline industry. At the beginning of the
eighties, European aviation was regulated by restrictive bilateral air service
agreements between the countries concerned. Each route was served by the
two national ‡ag carriers that used to jointly set a single price and evenly split
the demand. In the absence of entry, and with price and capacity agreements,
competition was not possible and a lack of incentives to improve e¢ciency char-
acterized the industry. This situation allowed …rms, in many cases subsidized
by their governments, to increase costs ine¢ciently.
Several authors have attempted to account for cost endogeneity problems
during this period. Among them, Neven and Röller (1996) and Neven, Röller
and Zhang (2001) develop a competition model where …rms face workers unions
and market pressures that may a¤ect operating costs. They apply this model
to the European airline industry for the regulated period, and show that the
model that accounts for costs endogeneity supports a more competitive result
than the standard one. Additionally, Ng and Seabright (2001) use a panel of
1See Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2003) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a and 2002b) for
an analysis of alternative regulatory mechanisms applied to Norwegian and French urban
transport networks.
3European and American carriers from 1982 to 1995 and a reduced cost-form in
order to show that state ownership substantially leads to higher operating costs.
Under the pressure of the US ”Open skies” policy that started in 1978,
several changes took place in the European market. First, some governments
started renegotiating their intra-European bilateral agreements. In 1984, the
UK and the Netherlands signed the …rst liberal bilateral agreement, that in 1985
was complemented with further deregulatory measures. Subsequently, some
other governments signed similar liberal bilateral agreements, e.g. UK-West
Germany (1985), UK-Belgium (1985) and UK-Ireland (1986), among others.2
As a result, entry and price reductions were possible in several European inter-
national routes, allowing for more competition.
Second, after several reports in favor of liberalization provided by the Euro-
pean Economic Commission,3 the European Community introduced a package
of measures at the end of 1987 that allowed for less restrictive capacity sharing
agreements, limited price reductions, and regulated entry on the busiest routes.
These measures were extended by a second and a third package in 1990 and
1992, respectively. In particular, the 1992 package of measures allows for free
entry by European carriers in any international European route, and forbids
agreements on either frequency, capacity or prices. By April 1997, the same
rules had to be applied to domestic routes within any EU country. This pro-
cess of gradual liberalization left the industry open to international competition,
introducing a signi…cant variation in …rms’ incentives.
Simultaneously, European ‡ag carriers got privatized and explicit permission
2Marín (1995) provides evidence on the e¤ects of these liberal bilateral agreements on route
level competition.
3See European Economic Commission (1984).
4by the EU authorities started to be necessary in order to receive any form of
public subsidy. The new competitive pressure became the strongest incentive for
carriers to reduce costs and improve e¢ciency. Additionally, during the second
half of the nineties, European carriers organized themselves around code-sharing
agreements and international alliances that emerged after long and complex
processes of negotiation.
In this paper we analyze the impact of the liberalization process on Euro-
pean airline companies’ e¢ciency and competition. To achieve this goal, we
construct and estimate a model of competition where airlines decide on cost
reducing e¤ort. The model includes a system of several equations that accounts
for the demand, the capacity constraint that relates the supply of the service to
consumers’ demand, and the technology of each transport operator. Technology
is described through a cost function that includes two non-observable parame-
ters, namely the exogenous technical ine¢ciency faced by each …rm and a cost
reducing e¤ort. Cost reducing e¤ort can be expressed by taking into account
the regulatory constraints impinging on the activity of each carrier. We are thus
able to de…ne a particular cost structure for each type of regulatory regime.
The objective of our work is threefold. First, using a non-nested procedure,
we test several scenarios of incentive pressures against each other in order to
identify the one that …ts better the data. We show that cost reducing e¤ort has
increased signi…cantly only after the introduction of the last E.U. package of
deregulatory measures in 1993, since the liberal bilateral agreements had lim-
ited e¤ects and the 1987 package of deregulatory measures had no e¤ect on
…rms’ behavior. Second, we compare our results with those that had been ob-
tained from a standard model with no endogenous e¤ort and/or no exogenous
5ine¢ciency. It is shown that they are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other
and that a model accounting for technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort is always pre-
ferred. Third, provided with these results, a price equation is determined and
our estimates on competition are tested against a Nash behavior hypothesis.
The results show that the standard model would undermeasure toughness of
competition.
Thus, our aim in this paper is to show that a proper modelization of the
incentives provided by regulatory pressures allows a better evaluation of com-
petitive forces. The next section presents the cost, supply, and demand systems
under consideration in the model. Section 3 focuses on the construction of the
endogenous cost function, that depends on the state of the regulation. Func-
tional forms, the estimation procedure, and the empirical results associated to
the cost function are developed in Section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to the evalu-
ation of competitive forces in the industry, which entails determining the pricing
rules set by European carriers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Determining the ingredients of the model
In what follows we specify a model for airlines’ behavior that encompasses sit-
uations of fully regulated as well as liberalized competitive markets. We are
concerned with the e¤ect of liberalization on market competition and …rms’ ef-
…ciency and the interconnection between these two decisions. Accordingly, in
the context of our model, airlines decide simultaneously about their cost reduc-
ing e¤ort and their pricing policy.
A modelling approach followed by several authors consists in assuming that
6…rms make individual decisions for each route they serve.4 This approach allows
for route speci…c policies. The advantage of this is that it takes into account
route characteristics that may a¤ect …rms’ behavior, such as the number and
identity of the competitors or the length and density of the route. An alterna-
tive approach followed in previous contributions assumes that companies take
corporate decisions that a¤ect their entire network.5
Leaving aside reasons related to data availability, we believe that the second
approach is more appropriate for our purposes. Airlines serve a large number of
interconnected routes that form a network. Sometimes consumers buy a com-
pany’s service in one single route (what is known as a direct ‡ight) but very
often they buy sets of (normally two or three) interconnected routes (indirect
‡ights through one or two hubs). Additionally, when buying a ticket in an indi-
vidual route, frequent consumers take into account the company’s network size
and characteristics since this a¤ects the ‡exibility to make further interconnec-
tions if needed, exchange tickets, take alternative routes and even enjoy frequent
‡yer prizes and discounts. In other words, scope economies among routes and
network e¤ects (almost) impose a common policy to all the routes served by
a given carrier. Our aim is to test whether the di¤erent waves of deregulation
that a¤ected the European market had a signi…cant impact on the global cost
reducing behavior of carriers. Whether the operator should …nd appropriate
and e¢cient solutions to solve potential con‡icts, to improve the training of its
employees, or to reorganize its productive structure are decisions that are worth
4See Borenstein (1989) for the American domestic market, amongothers, and Marín (1995)
for the European international market.
5See Röller and Sickles (2000), Neven and Röller (1996 and 2001), and Marín (1998) among
others.
7considering at the network level.
Costs
In the short run, …rms are endowed with a given technology that is deter-
mined by the quantity and quality of capital installed, as well as a network,
determined by the previous history. In order to provide a given amount of ser-
vice, Qi, a carrier must buy variable inputs, namely, labor, Li and materials,
Mi, which productivity depends on installed capital, Ki, and network exogenous
characteristics, zi. The production process and its underlying technology can
be implemented through a short-run dual cost function. Denoting by wL and
wM the price of labor and materials, the program of the …rm can be translated
into the following terms:
min
L;M
Ci = (wLL + wMM)exp(µ ¡ e),
subject to
Qi = Q(Li;Mi;Ki;zi;t;½);
where t is a trend, and ½ is a vector of parameters denoting technology.
Note that Ci are observed operating costs (which are di¤erent from e¢cient
operating costs), µ and e denote …rms’ individual ine¢ciency beyond the control
of the …rm, and e¤ort, two parameters that are unobservable.6 Thus, it is
6It might be usefull to note at this stage that the ine¢ciency term µ should be viewed
as a measure of relative ine¢ciency rather than absolute ine¢ciency. A measure of abso-
lute ine¢ciency includes a component that can be explained by exogenous factors that may
be captured by various explanatory variables (for instance, the size of the network and the
average stage lenght de…ned in the following sections). Hence, the parameter µ should be
rather considered as the unobservable part of the absolute ine¢ciency, not captured by the
explanatory variables.
8assumed that technical ine¢ciency prevents the …rm from reaching the required
output level Qi, and this may result in upward distorted costs. Cost reducing
e¤ort can be undertaken by managers to counterbalance the e¤ect of ine¢ciency.
For instance, managers may spend time and e¤ort in improving the location of
inputs within the network, monitoring employees, solving potential con‡icts,
etc. The associated short-run cost function, conditional on capital installed,
ine¢ciency and e¤ort is
Ci = C(Qi;!i;Ki;zi;µi;ei;¯); (1)
where ¯ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Assume moreover that cost
reducing e¤ort involves some internal cost or disutility that can be represented
through a convex function ª(ei;¹). Cost reducing e¤ort is endogenous and
depends on the regulatory constraint impinging on the activity of the airline
carrier.
Capacity
Before moving on to the demand side, we should notice that in transit indus-
tries, costs and revenues are driven by two di¤erent measures of output. Costs
are determined by capacity supplied, i.e., available seat-kilometers, that in turn,
depends on ‡eet capacity (measured by the number of seats available), and total
mileage performed by the airplanes. However, available seat-kilometers are only
an intermediate output that is used by consumers to produce the …nal output,
revenue passenger-kilometers (see Berechman, 1993). This …nal output, qi, de-
termines carriers’ revenues. Still, capacity and demand are closely related by a
function that may change with time, t, with the technology available,
9Qi = ©(qi;t;¸); (2)
where ¸ is a vector of parameters.
Demand
On the demand side, …rm i’s demand depends on own and competitors price,
pi and pj respectively, as wellas market exogenous characteristics, mi. A limited
number of competitors meets in each route, with the combination of competi-
tors changing from one route to another. Di¤erent competitors supply alter-
native products which di¤er in time schedule, number of stops, availability of
interconnections with other ‡ights, etc. Accordingly, the services o¤ered by dif-
ferent airlines can be regarded as imperfect substitutes. Actually, a small set
of competitors meets in each individual market. By assuming the same cost
reducing e¤ort and pricing policy for all the routes served by one company, we
are implicitly saying that pj represents the average price asked by the di¤erent
competitors that …rm i meets in the routes it serves. Accordingly, each carrier
faces a demand of the form,
qi(pi;pj;mi;t;®); i = 1;:::;N; (3)
where ® is a vector of parameters.
Next, we need to de…ne the structure of the system made of Equations (1)-
(3). This entails describing carefully the decisions made by the airline carriers,
namely cost reducing e¤ort and pricing. Before entering into the analysis, it
is worth reminding that the pricing structure itself is independent of the na-
ture of the regulatory pressures impinging on the activity of the …rm.7 For this
7The particular structure we use toincorporate technical ine¢ciency and e¤ort parameters
10reason, incentive e¤ects and pricing by …rms can be presented separately. Al-
though prices and e¤ort are determined simultaneously in the decision process,
we choose such an approach for ease of exposition.
3 Regulatory rules and costs
This section focuses on the construction of the structural cost function. During
the second half of the eighties, the European airline industry has switched from
bilateral air service agreements to more competitive markets. This might have
in‡uenced cost reducing activities. We propose to account for these regulatory
pressures through the cost function (1) that is conditional on the cost reducing
parameter e: Deriving the equilibrium level of e and plugging it back into the
primal cost expression allows us to account for endogenous e¤ort and derive
a structural cost form that can be estimated. The aim of such an approach
is twofold. First, di¤erent scenarios associated to the di¤erent waves of mar-
ket deregulation can be tested against each other in order to …gure out what
measures had signi…cant e¤ects on the behavior of European airline carriers in
terms of cost reduction. Second, accounting for changes in regulation through
the cost structure enables us to reduce the source of mispeci…cation, which in
turn, should avoid bias in the estimation of the technological parameters. This
will allow us to assess in a more satisfactory way the impact of regulatory con-
straints on the degree of competition of the industry.
Any …rm that is residual claimant for cost savings is willing to provide e¤ort
allows the incentive-pricing dichotomy principle to hold. (See La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). It
means that the same pricing formula applies whether we assume strong or soft regulatory
pressures.
11e in order to reduce its operating costs, Ci, in a signi…cant manner. Since the
cost reduction activity is costly, the …rm sets the optimal e¤ort level e that
maximizes its pro…t ¼i. Denoting by pi the price of the service to be sold, the
pro…t is simply de…ned as the di¤erence between revenue Ri = qi(¢)pi and total
cost TC = Ci (ei;:) + ª(ei;:). The program of the …rm is
max
e
¼i = qi(¢)pi ¡ Ci(©(qi(¢);¢);!i;Ki;zi;µi;ei) ¡ ª(ei): (4)
Note that since revenue Ri is independent of e¤ort e, this program is equiv-
alent to the one where the …rm sets the optimal e¤ort level e that minimizes






which implies that the optimal e¤ort level equalizes marginal cost savings and
the marginal disutility of e¤ort.
On the other hand, a …rm that is not residual claimant for cost reductions
has no incentives to provide costly e¤ort. Therefore the optimal e¤ort of a
non-residual claimant …rm is supposed to be equal to 0.
Before deregulation, European airline carriers were mainly public entities
regulated by bilateral service agreements. Subsidies would generally allow these
…rms to completely cover costs. It is therefore assumed that before deregula-
tion, any operator would behave as a non-residual claimant …rm and would not
provide any e¤ort at all. Denote by eR such an e¤ort level. After deregulation,
as already mentioned, the new competitive pressure as well as the abandon of
subsidizing practices would provide the operating …rms with perfect incentives
12for cost and ine¢ciency reduction. We consider then that the optimal e¤ort
provided by a deregulated …rm is given by the condition (5) and is denoted as




where s denotes the regulatory regime, that can be either regulation, R, or
deregulation, D.
4 Testing the e¤ects of liberalization on costs
The next step consists in proposing speci…c functional forms for the cost and
demand functions, as well as the cost reducing e¤ort and the engineering re-
lationship between demand and supply, in order to derive a set of structural
equations to be estimated. Using data on the European airline carriers before
and after the di¤erent waves of liberalization, we are capable of shedding light
on the cost structure that …ts reality the best, i.e., …guring out which package of
deregulation had a signi…cant impact on …rms behavior. This section presents
the empirical model, as well as the estimation results.
4.1 Empirical implementation
We assume a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for the cost function in (1). This spec-
i…cation retains the main properties desirable for a cost function and provides
a su¢ciently precise description of the technology, while remaining tractable
for our purpose.8 Alternative more ‡exible speci…cations such as the translog
8See Marín (1998) for details on the same choice for the airline industry
13function lead to cumbersome computations of the …rst order conditions when
e¤ort is unobserved. The cost function is then speci…ed as








i zi exp(¯t t + µi ¡ ei + uci) (7)
where !Li, !Mi, Ki and zi denote wages, price of materials, capital installed
and network exogenous characteristics that a¤ect the cost function, and t is a
trend.9 Additionally, ei represents e¤ort, µi is the ine¢ciency term, and uci is an
error term. Note that µ is characterized by a density function f (µ) de…ned over
an interval [µL;µU], where µL (µU resp.) denotes the most e¢cient (ine¢cient
resp.) …rm.
For our empirical speci…cation we assume that zi includes measures of air-







With respect to the internal cost of e¤ort and the engineering relationship
between demand, qi, and supply, Qi, represented in (2), we assume the following
functional forms,11
9The data and their construction are described in detail in the Appendix.
10See Marín (1998) and Neven et al. (2001) for discussions on the introduction of these
two variables in the cost function and for evidence on their e¤ects on airlines’ productivity.
A measure of airport concentration was included in an alternative speci…cation but it turned
out to be highly correlated with the size of the network.
11Notice that ª(ei) is a convex function, with ª(0)= 0, ª0(ei) >0 and ª00(ei)> 0.
14ª(ei) = exp(¹ei) ¡ 1; ¹ > 0; (9)
and
Qi = ¸0 q
¸1
i exp(¸t t + uQi); (10)
respectively, where uQi is an error term.
The demand equation corresponding to (3) is speci…ed in linear form as
follows
qi = ®0 + ®1 pi + ®2 pj + ®3 GCONSi + ®t t + uqi; (11)
where pi and GCON Si are …rm i’s weighted average price, and consumption
growth in its home country, as a measure of economic activity,12 pj is an index
of the price of all other airlines, t is a time trend and uqi is an error term.
Now, using the functional forms for operating cost (7), internal cost of e¤ort
(9), and the …rst order condition (5) on e¤ort activity, we are able to express
the e¤ort level under both regulation and deregulation periods. Note that the




12Some alternative measures of economic activity where included in this expression in either
with or without GCONS. The inclusion of several variables was leading to multicolinearity
problems. When only one of the variables was included, none provided a better …t that
GCONS. Accordingly, we decided to drop alternative variables and leave GCONS only.





(ln ¯0 + ¯1 lnQi + ¯2 ln!Li + ¯3 ln!Mi + ¯4 ln Ki +
¯5 lnNETi + ¯ 6 lnASLi + µ ¡ ln ¹ + uci); (13)
while
eR
i = 0: (14)
As predicted by the new theory of regulation, the e¤ort level of the residual
claimant …rm increases with µ, i.e., a more ine¢cient carrier needs to be more
active in cost reducing activities than a less ine¢cient one in order to reach the
same cost level. Note moreover that these carriers are willing to provide lower
e¤ort levels when e¤ort is more costly (the cost reducing technology parameter ¹
is greater). Substituting back eD and eR into the primal cost structure (7) allows




































i zi exp(¯t t + µi + uci); (16)
where ³ =
¹




k = ³¯k, and u0
ci = ³uci.












































i takes value 1 if the …rm operates in a deregulated industry and
0 otherwise, while »
R
i takes value 1 if the …rm operates in a regulated industry





will be assumed depending on the nature of the various deregulatory measures
introduced in the European airlines market, and their results will be tested
against each other in order to unravel their e¤ects on competition.
The system of equations formed by (10), (11) and (17) is determined si-
multaneously. Accordingly and in order to avoid endogeneity problems, these
equations are estimated by the Instrumental Variables Estimation Method. The
cost function (17) includes a non-observable parameter, namely µ; characterized
by a Half-Normal density function f (µ): When estimating this cost-function,
one needs to compute the integral of the joint density function of µ and uci over
[0;1]:13 Note that the system is identi…ed and all parameters can be recovered,
given that by homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices, ¯1 + ¯2 = 1.
4.2 Estimation results
Tables 1 to 4 provide the results for the econometric model. We emphasize in
this section the two main arguments that are discussed in this paper: First,
depending on how deregulation is interpreted, di¤erent cost structures can be
estimated. Then, a non-nested test helps us to choose the best cost structure
in the sense that it is the one that …ts the data the best.
13For more details, the reader should refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
17Table 1 presents the results for the demand equation. The coe¢cients of all
the variables are signi…cant and have the expected sign. Table 2 presents the
demand-capacity relationship. Again, the coe¢cients are signi…cant and have
the expected sign. In both cases, the overall …t of the regression is satisfactory.
The main interest of these two equations is to provide instruments for capacity
and demand.
Table 3 presents the estimates for the cost function as well as the e¤ort
disutility parameters, obtained from the estimation of equation (17). In order
to test the e¤ect of liberalization, this equation is estimated under alternative
scenarios related to the deregulatory packages introduced by the EU and the
liberal bilateral agreements signed by the UK with other countries. In all cases
but (1), we include the term µ to measure ine¢ciency. Additionally, the fol-
lowing distinctions are made: 1) model with no e¤ort and no ine¢ciency term,
2) …rms do not make any e¤ort to reduce ine¢ciency after the introduction of
deregulatory measures, i.e., the e¤ect of deregulation is not accounted for, 3)
deregulation a¤ects …rms’ behavior after the third E.U. package of measures
in 1992, and 4) deregulation a¤ects the behavior of the …rms a¤ected by the
introduction of liberal bilateral agreements, which are British Airways, KLM,
Lufthansa, and Sabena, after 1985, and the remaining companies in 1993.14 The
comparison of scenarios (3) and (4) allows us to identify whether the liberal bi-
lateral agreements have any e¤ect on …rms’ behavior.
Additionally, in order to test whether the E.U.deregulatory measures started
14Scenario (4), with British Airways, KLM and Lufthansa changing behavior after the
introduction of liberal bilateral agreements in 1985, has been selected after comparison with
any other sensible combination of …rms being a¤ected by the agreements. The results are
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
18having e¤ect in 1987, i.e., after the introduction of the …rst package of measures,
we also try two alternative scenarios: 3’) deregulation a¤ects …rms’ behavior af-
ter the …rst E.U. package of measures in 1987, and 4’) deregulation a¤ects the
behavior of the …rms a¤ected by the introduction of liberal bilateral agreements
after 1985, and the remaining companies in 1987. Finally, given that some new
competitors like Easy Jet and Virgin, not included in the sample, started oper-
ating a signi…cant number of international European routes during the period
1997-99, and this could bias our measure of rivals’ prices, we construct scenario
(3”), which is recovered from scenario (3) after having excluded the last two
years of observations, namely 1998 and 1999.
The variable capital has been dropped from the regressions because the cor-
relation coe¢cient between output and capital is 0.91, causing multicollinearity
problems.15 Additionally, running a maximum likelihood test, it was not pos-
sible to reject the model without capital against a model including it at any
sensible con…dence level.16 Moreover, scenarios (3’) and (4’) cannot be esti-
mated due to convergence problems with the coe¢cient ¹. This indicates that
the models are clearly mispeci…ed, suggesting that the deregulatory measures
included in the …rst E.U. package had no e¤ect on …rms’ behavior, probably due
to their limited scope. This result is consistent with Ng and Seabright (2001).
For the remaining scenarios, the variables are signi…cant and have the ex-
pected sign. Costs are increasing with wages and production. The alternative
15This correlation problem is common to most empirical studies dealingwith the estimation
of short run costs functions.
16We alsoestimated a long run cost function where capital was regarded as a variable input.
Accordingly, a measure for the price of capital was computed from the companies’ accounting
data and included in the cost function. This variable was not signi…cant at any con…dence
level.
19scenarios are tested against each other applying the test of nonnested hypothesis
proposed in Vuong (1989). The test shows that scenario (4) cannot be rejected
against scenario (3), but the sign of the test indicates that scenario (3) …ts the
data better. This suggests that liberal bilateral agreements had a limited e¤ect
on …rms’ behavior, probably because they regarded only a reduced number of
routes. In addition, the results for scenario (3”) are consistent with those for
scenario (3).
Scenarios (1) and (2) are rejected against scenario (3), which includes an inef-
…ciency measure and assumes that deregulation a¤ects …rms’ behavior after the
introduction of the third E.U. package of deregulatory measures in 1992. Given
that scenario (1) represents the standard approach proposed by the literature
focusing on oligopolistic competition, its rejection advocates the construction of
models including these components and indicates that we have to be cautious
when interpreting the results derived from other models. More in particular,
rejection of scenario (2) shows the importance of accounting for the e¤ects of
deregulation on …rms’ technology and ine¢ciency.
One could also compare the results regarding ine¢ciency that had been ob-
tained if a model with no e¤ort had been estimated, i.e., scenario (2), with those
obtained with scenario (3). We observe that ine¢ciency had been overestimated
for all the companies. The average …rm’s ine¢ciency level is 0.212 (0.368 resp.)
under scenario (3) (scenario (2) resp.) The two values are signi…cantly di¤erent
as measured by a t-test (H0 : µ(2) ¡ µ(3) = 0) whose statistic is equal to 6.646.
Taken together, the two periods of regulation and deregulation allow us to
identify the cost reducing activity (i.e., e¤ort) in the model since a di¤erent
cost structure (a di¤erent technology) for each period is considered. Hence, the
20technology and the technical ine¢ciency can be estimated. Once this is done, a
precise evaluation of the nature of competition in the industry after deregulation
can be obtained in a second step. We turn now to the competitive aspect of our
study.
5 Evaluating competition
Having now the most adequate cost estimates in hands, we are capable of provid-
ing measures that characterize the degree of competition in the industry after
the introduction of liberalization in 1992. Our results are compared to what
would have been obtained if cost endogeneity had not been taken into account.
We de…ne the pricing program of each airline carrier. Again, we need to
distinguish the period of state regulation from the period of deregulation during
which …rms are set free to choose prices in order to maximize their pro…t. Before
deregulation, i.e., when …rms are still state owned and regulated, the maximiza-
tion program presented in (19) is irrelevant. During this period, prices result
from bilateral agreements set by public authorities and are under the control
of the …rms only partially. We could think about alternative programs for this
period, such as social welfare maximizing or monopoly pricing. This would how-
ever go beyond the scope of the paper since our intention is to focus on …rms’
competitive practices after deregulation.
In a deregulated environment, provided with the cost and demand functions,
each …rm solves the following program,
max
pi
¼ i = qi(¢)pi ¡ C
D(©(qi(¢);¢);!i;Ki;zi;µi;e
D) ¡ ª(ei); (18)
21where pi is the optimal price to be chosen.
Accordingly, the …rst order conditions for …rm i are given by



















The term ¢i accounts for di¤erences in price elasticities under di¤erent com-
petitive situations. Using the estimates of the cost, capacity and demand system
obtained in the previous section, our aim is to evaluate the price-cost margins
(expressed in the left-hand side of Equation 19) under the various scenarios un-
der consideration, and test these margins against those that could be obtained
if carriers obeyed to a perfect Nash behavior, i.e., when ¢i =
@ qi
@pi. Thus, we
can …gure out whether di¤erent conclusions can be reached regarding carriers’
competitive behavior if di¤erent scenarios are accounted for.
From the expressions of demand (11), capacity (10) and costs (17), the price











Through the estimation of the cost function, marginal costs, MCi, can be
easily recovered. Putting them together with our estimate of the capacity-
demand elasticity ¸1, as well as the observed values for supply, demand and
prices, we are able to evaluate the weighted price-marginal cost margin, Mi, set
22by each carrier, de…ned as the left-hand side of Equation (20). Table 4 presents
the values obtained under Scenario (1) and Scenario (3). Two interesting results
are worth emphasizing: First, considering the traditional approach with no
ine¢ciency and no e¤ort, namely Scenario (1), would undervalue the average
marginal costs, MC, and overestimate the margin, M, of the industry. Hence,
the so-called traditional approach would undervalue the competition faced by
the European airline carriers. The margins obtained under scenario (1) and
(3) are signi…cantly di¤erent as shown by a t-test (H0 : MT
1 ¡ MT
3 = 0)17
whose statistic is equal to 7.802. Second, the companies (denoted by LBA) that
pioneered the liberalization process and signed liberal bilateral agreements with
other EU countries and the US obtain higher margins, even if these companies
face lower marginal costs and propose lower prices.
Using our estimates for the demand equation, note that, as suggested by the
right-hand side of Equation (20), Nash behavior would entail an average margin
M T
N for all the carriers in the sample equal to 1.212. Our price-marginal cost
margin values obtained under Scenario (1) and (3) both lie below the Nash-
behavior margin M T
N. A t-test (H0 : M T
l ¡M T
N = 0; l = 1;3) presented in Table
(5) shows that neither of the two scenarios entails pure Nash behavior, although
scenario (3) supports a more competitive behavior.
It is also worth distinguishing carriers that pioneered the liberalization pro-
cess during the eighties (those labelled LBA) and those that switched to a
competitive market after 1992. Table (4) has suggested that British Airways,
KLM, and Lufthansa were the operators setting the highest margins. This does
17MT
i denotes the averageprice-marginal cost margin under scenario(i) when all thecarriers
of the database are considered.
23not imply however that these …rms have a less competitive behavior. Note that,
from the ratio qi=pi, evaluated at the average observation of the sample, it can
be seen that the LBA companies meet demand on a more inelastic portion of the
curve than other companies.18 Hence, pure Nash behavior for LBA companies
entails a margin MLBA
N equal to 2.075, while for other companies the margin,
M O
N , is equal to 0.780. Table (5) shows that the values of these margins under






N = 0 and H O
0 : MO
l ¡ M O
N = 0; l = 1;3)
suggest that neither of the two scenarios predicts Nash behavior for any set of
companies. However, the other companies are closer to Nash behavior than the
LBA carriers, suggesting that the latter have a more competitive behavior.
6 Conclusions
The results obtained in this paper have proved fruitful on both methodological
and institutional sides. First, it has been shown that a cost-supply-demand
structure that accounts for …rms’ technical ine¢ciency and cost reducing ac-
tivities …ts better to the data than the usual model proposed by the literature
focusing on oligopolistic competition. Moreover, our application of this method-
ology to the airlines industry shows that the results obtained under the standard
oligopoly model would be seriously biased and could lead to the wrong conclu-
sions about e¢ciency and competition in the industry.
Second, it is suggested that the 1992 European deregulation package intro-
duced a signi…cant change in the behavior of airline carriers regarding e¢ciency
improvement. We show that competition has increased signi…cantly only after
18The q=p ratio is more than three times higher on average for the LBA carriers.
24the introduction of the last package of deregulatory measures in 1992, since the
liberal bilateral agreements had very limited e¤ects and the 1987 E.U. package of
deregulatory measures had no e¤ect on …rms’ behavior. We also show that esti-
mated competition is tougher than if obtained from a standard oligopoly model.
This result is consistent with previous contributions in the same industry that
take into account cost endogeneity in di¤erent manners.
This model could be improved or extended in di¤erent ways and directions.
First, a set of alternative models representing competition in the regulated pe-
riod could be tested against each other, in order to test whether there is a
dominance of private versus public objectives. Second, in this paper we analyze
the e¤ects of deregulation, and the subsequent cost reducing e¤ort, on short
run price competition. However, e¤ort can be devoted to reorganize the net-
work structure of the …rm. A careful analysis of the changes in carriers’ network
structure after the deregulatory process could be of great interest. Finally, we
are interested in designing a more complicated model where the e¤ort level e
depends on a set of variables, such as the degree of regulation, privatization,
competition, etc., in a continuous manner.
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27Appendix. Data description and construction of the
variables.
The dataset has been constructed for the period 1985-1999 from raw data
included in Digest of Statistics published by International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), World Air Transport Statistics published by International
Air Transport Association (IATA), and Economic Outlook published by the
Economics and Statistics Department of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The companies under study are the ‡ag
carriers from the largest European countries a¤ected by the European liber-
alization process, namely, Alitalia, Air France, Air Portugal, British Airways,
Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Sabena and SAS.
The variables have been constructed as follows. In the cost function, pro-
duction, (Qi), wages (!Li), capital (Ki) and average stage length (ASLi) corre-
spond to total operating expenses (ICAO), seat-kilometers available, ‡ight crew
salaries and expenses and maintenance and overhaul expenses over number of
employees, ‡eet total number of seats, and total aircraft kilometers over total
aircraft departures, respectively. With respect to total costs, companies report
one single …gure that corresponds to passengers, freight and mail activities.
The distribution of operations among these three activities can vary signi…-
cantly among companies. However, it is easy to obtain information on the total
number of tonne-Kilometers performed that correspond to passengers (includ-
ing baggage), freight and mail, respectively. We multiply total costs reported
by each company by the share of tones-kilometers performed corresponding to
passengers in order to compute our cost variable (Ci). The data needed to
construct these variables have been retrieved from di¤erent issues of Digest of
28Statistics published by ICAO, apart from number of employees that are pub-
lished by IATA. NETi is constructed by the total number of route kilometers an
airline operates on (IATA). Finally, the price of materials (!Mi) has been con-
structed as the average fuel prices for the carrier’s home country and the OECD
(published by OECD), weighted by the company’s domestic and international
operations respectively (ICAO).
On the demand side, demand (qi) corresponds to passenger-kilometers per-
formed and …rm i’s weighted average price (pi) is measured as passenger revenues
over passenger-kilometers performed . Rivals’s price (pj) is the average price
of the remaining companies in the database, weighted by total seat-kilometers
available. All of them from ICAO. Consumption growth (GCON Si) corresponds
to domestic private consumption (OECD). Finally, t the time trend, is equal to
one in 1985 and incremented by one each year.
29Table 1: Demand function. Dependent variable: qi . 
Instrumental Variables Estimation Method 
Variable  Coefficient  Estimate 
Constant  a0  0.01 
(0.09) 
pi  a1  -3.55 
(0.52) 
pj  a2  4.52 
(0.82) 
GCONSi  a3  0.0005 
(0.00) 
T  at  0.01 
(0.003) 
Standard Deviation 
of the error term 
  0.12 
(0.01) 
R
2    0.76 
Note:   Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Demand-Capacity relationship. Dependent variable: ln(Qi). 
Instrumental Variables Estimation Method. 
Variable  Coefficient  Estimate 
Constant  l0  5.31 
(0.78) 
Ln(qi)  l1  0.68 
(0.05) 
t  lt  0.05 
(0.01) 
Standard Deviation 
of the error term 
  0.45 
(0.03) 
R
2    0.67 
Note:   Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Table 3. Cost function. Dependent variable: ln(Ci
*). Instrumental Variables Estimation Method. 
Variable   Coeff.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3’’) 










































































Standard Deviation of the 
error term 











2    0.88         
Vuong test. Scenario (3) 
against alternative scenarios 
  2.932  2.835    1.460   
Notes:   Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Values for the Vuong test below –2 favor the alternative model against model (3), and above 2 favor model (3) against the alternative model. 
Scenarios:  (1) Deregulation has no effect (ei=0), and the model does not account for one-side inefficiency (qi=0). 
(2) Deregulation has no effect. 
(3) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1992.  
(4) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
(3’’) As scenario (3) but dropping the observations for the last two years (1998-1999). Note that (3’’) and (3) cannot be tested against each other since they 
consider two samples of different sizes. 
In all scenarios but (1) the model accounts for one-side inefficiency term (qi  ‡ 0). Table 4. Marginal costs, prices and margins. 
  Scenario (1)  Scenario (3) 
  MC  Price
**  M
***  MC  Price
**  M
*** 
All carriers  0.053  0.107  0.497  0.083  0.107  0.203 
LBA
*  0.041  0.097  0.586  0.066  0.097  0.334 
Other carriers but 
LBA   0.058  0.111  0.451  0.091  0.111  0.138 
Notes:   All values for marginal costs and margins are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
* 
 LBA stands for Liberal Bilateral Agreements and includes British Airways, KLM and 
Lufthansa.
 
  ** Observed values. 
  *** M stands for the price-marginal cost margin as expressed in Equation (20). 
 
 
Table 5. Comparing estimated margins with Nash behavior. 
Scenario (1)  Scenario (3)
 
Companies  Nash 
behavior 
Estimated  t-test*
  Estimated  t-test* 
All carriers  1.212  0.497  -6.203  0.204  -8.600 
LBA  2.075  0.586  -11.102  0.334  -12.799 
Other carriers  0.780  0.451  -2.998  0.138  -5.692 
Note:  




Table A1. Cost function. Alternative scenarios.  
 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 




































































































































  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
(3)  -  1.460  2.154  2.284  1.805  3.165  2.040  4.848  1.589 
(4)  -  -  0.696  0.522  1.881  4.618  0.360  3.406  1.530 
(5)  -  -  -  0.198  0.432  2.500  -0.127  4.164  0.039 
(6)  -  -  -  -  0.176  1.751  -0.952  5.126  -0.070 
(7)  -  -  -  -  -  6.297  -0.340  2.712  -1.365 
(8)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -1.968  1.437  -6.011 
(9)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  4.955  0.086 
(10)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -2.908 
Notes:    Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Vuong Test, line (i) against column (j), i.e., values for the Vuong test below –2 favor the model in column (j), and above 
2 favor the model in line (i). 
Scenarios: 
(5) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
(6) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways and KLM, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
 
(7) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways and Lufthansa, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
(8) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways and Sabena, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
(9) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, Sabena and KLM, and after 1992 for the remaining 
companies. 
(10) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, Sabena and Lufthansa, and after 1992 for the remaining 
companies. 
(11) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa and Sabena, and after 1992 for the 
remaining companies. 